But is the distinction versus imitation tension reallyunshakeable? That is, must we absolutely suppose that there exists a smallgroup of persons which invent and create certain cultural traits by whichthey aim only to distinguish themselves from a large mass of peopledestined, at most, to imitate them?
Even at the level of that innovating elite, not only is the drive todistinguish oneself already at work, but the drive to imitate as well. Forexample, even in the collaboration between Marx and Engels, we can say thatEngels in some ways imitated Marx. There are many other examples. Realinnovators without peers are few and far between. But the same is true infashion: one distinguishes oneself from the crowd by imitating some admiredand envied personality. On the other hand, even the millionth girl whodecides to cut her hair "according to the latest fashion" stilldistinguishes herself: from her mother or from the girl next door who stilldoes not dare to do it.
Distinction and imitation are thus two faces of the same coin: oneimitates an idealised other in order to distinguish oneself from the rest,and also by changing ones imitative allegiance. Therefore the fashiontension is not really structurally different in various cultural and socialclasses; rather, only the extension of the distinction varies. Inshort, the elite is characterised by the maximal extension of thedistinction: the type of hat or the aesthetic taste adopted by the elite isdistinct from almost all else, and for a while, the elite does somethingunique. In the most prestigious and influential fashion shows - inMilan, Paris, or New York - the great designers strive to present clothesso eccentric that nobody will dare to wear them. Someone innocentlyremarks, "what business sense is there in proposing clothes which nobody,except for a very few snobs - and then only once - will wear?" In effect,these big shows followed by the world press represent a distinctiveapex, the peak of a singular, distinctive uniqueness: those famousmodels may well be the only ones in the world to wear those clothesdesigned expressly to scandalise the "conventional folk". Yet the very samedesigner has available more moderate, and less expensive, versions of thesame "idea" which he will sell to a wider market. In fact, they will haveavailable various models with decreasing "shock value", each fit to thesocial area which can afford this given style.
Female fashion - like every other kind - appears like a pyramid at whosetop one finds the supermodel exhibited in order to be imitated and yetbasically inimitable. Just as a creative genius offers him or herself toimitation yet remains inimitable in their creativity, so the goddess-modelsof our times embody this extreme distinction. The daringoutfits they wear do not prevent further imitation, but rather nourish it,offering the unattainable paradigm which will inspire every consumer'ssyntagms, that is, their compromises with daily banality.
On the contrary, one becomes less and less elite and ever more a part ofthe mass as the extension of ones differentiating ambition narrows. In thisambit, fashion followers distinguish themselves at the most within theiroffices, families or neighbourhoods. A person who is perceived by those ina particular environment as being "one who follows the fashion"distinguishes themselves in this environment, but their social rank isstill determined by the absolute dimensions of this environment from whichthey seek to distinguish themselves.
We might then substitute Simmel's distinction versus imitationopposition with one more general, and hence more rich: the oppositionbetween intensity and extensity. When a novelty is absolute,it has a maximum intensity, in the sense that it creates real, truepassions, be they positive or negative: scandal and enthusiasm, disgust andlove, anxiety and attraction. The novelty is perceived either as a seriousthreat to our children or as salvation and revelation. As the novelty gainsin extension and loses its novelty, it loses its intensity and itsinformative capacity. The theory of information in fact correlates theincrease of information with improbability: the more an event isimprobable, the more it appears meaningful and thus informative. As apolitical belief (or the style for wearing a hat) spreads, an encounterwith this hat or that political belief becomes ever more probable and thusincreasingly less meaningful. What I call here extensity is the spreadingof a feature which corresponds with a proportional diminishing ofintensity.
The lessening informational intensity of this feature owing to itsextension is correlated with the extension of the space or environmentwhere this ex-novelty is adopted. As previously mentioned, as a featurepropagates itself, it interests more and more individuals who aim todistinguish themselves within an ever narrower social environment or scope.In extending itself, the innovation loses intensity because it is adoptedin order to produce intensity (distinction, that is information) in evernarrower contexts.
In fact, an idea or custom has its maximal innovative intensity - itsmaximal significance - when it is still restricted to a small group. Forexample, polls and inquiries carried out among the young and studentsbetween 1967-1970 in countries where youth and student protest movementswere exploding - such as Italy, France and West Germany - showed that, infact, quite moderate or even conservative ideas and mentalities prevailedamongst them in this period. Indeed, during these years, the ideas of theprotest movements reached their greatest intensity, yet it was preciselybecause of this that they were not very extensive. At that time, DanielCohn-Bendit in France theorised on the role of the "minoritéagissante". Even amongst the young, it was a minority that wasresponsible for the big movements that turned France upside down. Yet theseminorities at the time felt they were riding a wave, and that they wereproducing great intensities in relation to their context. At that time, infact, the difference in styles of dressing - not to mention thinking -between the young and the not-so-young widened. This split was especiallynotable in Great Britain, which produced a type of pop music which markedan epoch probably because it embodied a radical distinction betweenthe old and the young, past and present, tradition and innovation. Do thoseEnglish songs appear today as "classics" because of their intrinsicquality? There is nothing more disputable than the intrinsic quality of anartistic creation. Even today, we can listen to songs - like "All You Needis Love" or "(I Can't Get No) Satisfaction" - with a certain emotionbecause they carry, even if attenuated by the impact of time, a certaindistinctive force.
When at the end of the seventies - the "flowing back years" as they werecalled in Continental Europe - sociologists interviewed the young people ofthat epoch, they realised that the principles and exigencies of the elitewhich had played an active role in 1967-1970 had now been assumed by themajority of youth, although in less radical forms.[4]
