End of April, severalinternational mediarelayed accusations againstApple sourcing ‘conflict minerals’from eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The reality behind these allegations is however quite complex. The reasons for the Congolese government to speak out now, seem to go beyond concerns related to human rights violations along mineral supply chains. The allegations are rather triggered by regional tensions in the Great Lakes region and the worsening security situation in Congo’s North Kivu province. Nevertheless, preoccupations over industry efforts to source more responsibly are valid.
Why now?
There is a fair chance that Apple has so-called ‘conflict minerals’ in its supply chains. That actually goes for many international tech companies that face challenges in the regional (mineral) trade. Issues affecting their supply chain are not new, and include smuggling and tax evasion by mineral traders, corruption by state agents, the prevalence of the informal economy, and dysfunctional trace of origin systems. The question arises what triggered the Congolese government to denounce Apple, and why it does so now?
Mounting regional tensions between Rwanda and the DRC seem to have prompted the latter to speak out. Since 2021, the “March 23 Movement” (M23) has seized vast territories of Congo’s North Kivu province with military support from Rwanda, leading to increased anti-Rwandan sentiments in the DRC. In the run-up to the December 2023presidential elections, the Tshisekedi government has further increased its anti-Rwanda discourse. While Rwanda does play an important role in the conflict in North Kivu, the Congolese government tends to put the blame for insecurity in eastern DRC entirely on Rwanda. In doing so, the Congolese government tries to mask its own failures with regard to the security situation in the east of the country (related to security sector reform, demobilization of armed groups, socio-economic challenges, and intercommunity tensions).
Within this anti-Rwanda climate, the DRC government hasincreasingly denouncedthe country’s loss of significant (tax) income due to the smuggling of minerals to its eastern neighbor. It engaged the law firm Amsterdam & Partners LLP to investigate these accusations. The tone ofAmsterdam & Partners’ report, as well as its recommendations, fits the anti-Rwanda discourse very well: The report focuses on Rwanda’s role in illegal mineral trade, but fails to mention that other neighboring countries also facilitate smuggling from eastern DRC. Moreover, Apple seems to be used in the press release to attract international attention to the report’s findings.
An oversimplification of the link between minerals and conflict
In thepress releaseon its report entitled“Blood Minerals – The Laundering of DRC’s 3T Minerals by Rwanda and Private Entities”, Amsterdam & Partners LLP immediately explains that the “report’s cover is emblazoned with a statement popularized by Congolese soccer players in recent silent protests: Everyone sees the massacres in eastern Congo. But everyone is silent.”
As such, the report imputes a direct link between mineral trade in the region, and conflict and human rights violations in eastern DRC — a logic that has been challenged by many observers, who underline that causes of conflict and insecurity are much more complex. A recent IPIS report on M23, for example, highlights the importance of tensions overaccess to land and local powerto understand the conflict in North Kivu. Additionally,the role of natural resources in conflictneeds to be nuanced. Illicit trade of natural resources is just one factor among many others that help to explain conflict dynamics, including access to land, intercommunity tensions, and their historical roots, failed Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) programs for armed groups, and long-lasting governance issues such as elite capture, underperforming corrupt state services, and faltering mining sector formalization processes.
It is important to challenge Amsterdam & Partners’ oversimplified analysis of conflict in eastern DRC, and in particular the role of minerals in conflict, for several reasons:
- The ‘conflict minerals’ narrative has not been helpful over the past fifteen years in finding structural solutions for sustainable peace in eastern DRC. On the contrary, by adopting an incorrect macro-perspective, it ignored local sensitivities and at times even fostered conflict.
- Moreover, it risks creating a negative picture of the (artisanal) mining sector in eastern DRC, potentially reinforcing disengagement from mineral traders (and the downstream industry), while the sector is of crucial importance for the local economy, and for the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of families.
Additionally, the press release draws an incomplete picture of the issue of ‘conflict minerals’ in eastern DRC, stating for example that “These activities have fueled a cycle of violence and conflict by financing militias and terrorist groups, and have contributed to forced child labor and environmental devastation.”While non-state armed groups, or militias, were present at 29% of the mines in anIPIS samplein 2021-2023 (242 of 829 mines), the most pressing problem is the performance of the DRC’s national army. FARDC soldiers have developed several illegal ways of generating revenues, in and outside the mining sector. They engaged in illicit activities at 37% of the mining sites of the same IPIS sample.
Maps of interference at mining sites, by FARDC units and non-state armed groups.
DRC’s outrage over international inaction in response to Rwanda’s support to M23
In light of the international community’s failure to take decisive action against Rwanda, the attempt of DRC to draw attention to Rwanda’s military support to armed groups in DRC does not come as a surprise.
Rwanda’s blatant military support to the M23generated widespread international indignation. While several Europeangovernmentsand theEUhave condemned Rwanda’s support to M23,Europe however continued to engage with Rwandaover the past few years, in fields that are at times closely linked to security and mineral supply chains. This includes for instance, the signature of anMoU on Sustainable Raw MaterialsValue Chains, amilitary aid packagefor Kigali linked to the deployment of its troops in Mozambique, or the UK-Rwanda asylum plan. European countries and the European Union should be mindful that (their communication around) these collaborations with Kigali are very badly perceived in DRC.
What about Rwanda and Apple?
Amsterdam & Partners rightfully flags the issue of mineral smuggling. The phenomenon deprives the DRC of tax income, and neighboring countries (including Rwanda) facilitate, and profit from, this illegal trade.
The focus on Apple’s role in the press release is quite provocative, as the tech company has been one of the most active ones over the past 10 years in thinkingconstructively about ways to make supply chains more responsible, without disengaging from the Great Lakes region (and from ‘Conflict-affected and high-risk areas’ (CAHRAs) in general).
While the press release focuses on Apple, the full report does explain more generally how smuggling affects the mineral trade in the region. Consequently, it also lists a range of other companies that source from the region and are also concerned by the accusations. However, it needs to be underlined that these companies are not directly involved in mineral trade in the Great Lakes region, but rely on a range of suppliers that buy minerals from the region. That said, downstream actors, such as the big tech companies (including Apple), do have the obligation to implement supply chain due diligence, which, according toOECD,requires them torespect human rights and avoid contributing to conflict through their mineral sourcing practices.
To identify and mitigate risks in their supply chains of tin, tantalum (coltan) and tungsten (in short 3T minerals) in the Great Lakes region, suppliers, and downstream companies currently rely partly on the International Tin Supply Chain Initiative (iTSCi), which has been established by the International Tin Association (ITA). iTSCi establishes traceability in the upstream 3T mineral chain (labeling 3T mineral production at the mine site and along the trade route to verify the origin). It implements related activities to monitor the supply chains, including incident reporting, risk management, etc.
Over the past years, different types of actors – includingGlobal Witness, Responsible Minerals Initiative(RMI), and academics (e.g.University of Antwerp, andMusamba J. and Vogel C.) – have voiced serious concerns about iTSCi’s functioning. IPIS’ fieldresearch in artisanal miningareas in eastern DRC also came across many cases of inaccurate tagging practices, loopholes in traceability, and ‘contamination’ of supply chains that are covered by traceability. An internal UN report even suspected iTSCi ofallowing or even “actively facilitating” the massive leakage offraudulent coltan.All these reports raise serious concerns regarding the efficiency of ‘responsible sourcing’ in eastern DRC. Both downstream (including tech companies) and midstream (smelters and refiners) actors should demand that their upstream due diligence systems, and in particular iTSCi, be more accountable for the deficiencies in their system. A better consultation of, and closer collaboration with, actors in the DRC (civil society, government representatives, and local economic actors) for the design, implementation, and evaluation of these systems is a crucial first step.
Finally, Rwanda’s role in illegal mineral trade should not be underestimated. The country is, for example, suspected for some time ofcapturing part of the coltan productionfrom the important Rubaya mining sites. The Congolese government nowaccuses M23 of directly exporting Rubaya’s production to Rwandaafter the armed group conquered the area just a few weeks ago. Issues however extend beyond Rwanda and beyond minerals. For several decades, it has been an enormous challenge to export Congolese minerals via legal supply chains. Both within DRC, and across the border, awide range of stakeholders, including formal institutions, are involved in cross-border smuggling to Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda. While Rwanda is historically the main point of export for Congolese 3T minerals, Uganda and Rwanda have been in competition over the past years, to be the main gateway for Congolese gold to the world market. The competition over mineral export routes is part of larger regional geopolitics: eastern DRC is an important marketplace for its neighbors, including for agricultural products, consumer goods, and services. It seems that these regional tensions, and frustrations over DRC’s closer collaboration with Burundi and Uganda, have prompted Rwanda to provide military support to M23.
Further reading
ITSCI is unwilling to address failures of its due diligence scheme | 4 November 2022 | Global Witness
In April 2022 we published the detailed report The ITSCI laundromat – How a due diligence scheme appears to launder conflict minerals, uncovering the serious failures of the ITSCI traceability and due diligence scheme in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda. In its public response ITSCI fails to adequately address any of the problems raised or necessary reforms.
The Problem with “Conflict Minerals” | 1st October 2021 | Dissent Magazine
In the early 2000s, activists began to campaign against the extraction of “conflict minerals.” Today, violence continues unabated in eastern Congo, underscoring the misguided frameworks governing transnational intervention.
The M23 “version 2” – Local stakes, motivations, perceptions, and impacts | April 2024 | IPIS
Since 2021, the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has once again fallen victim to the “March 23 Movement” (M23). Supposedly defeated in 2013, the M23 took up arms again in 2021, and by 2022 had rapidly seized vast territories in the south-east of North Kivu province.
Analysis of the interactive map of artisanal mining areas in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (2023 update) | December 2023 | IPIS
Since 2009, IPIS has mapped and collected data at more than 2,800 Artisanal and Small-scale Mining (ASM) sites in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). In this report, IPIS provides its 2023 update of the state of ASM in the eastern DRC, based on data from over 829 ASM sites in the eastern DRC between 2021-2023. The study analyses linkages between mining, conflict, and insecurity in ASM, and evaluates why current responsible sourcing initiatives have failed to decrease armed interference in mining, let alone positively impact security overall. The data collected for the study can be consulted through IPIS’ interactive web map and Open Data Dashboard.
Armed conflict, insecurity, and mining in eastern DRC: reflections on the nexus between natural resources and armed conflict | December 2022 | IPIS
This report offers a new framework for looking at the eastern Congo conflict, one within which new evolutions of the past twenty years find a place. Indeed, violent conflict in eastern Congo has changed dramatically in all its aspects over the past two decades. Yet too often policymakers and observers appear to assume that we are dealing with a proxy war orchestrated from the DRC’s eastern neighboring countries. The over-simplified and incorrect narrative is then that large rebel movements are directed by neighboring countries to satisfy their insatiable hunger for ‘conflict minerals’. Still according to this simplified version of the facts, we find the civilian population and the weak, Congolese government on the side of the victims.
All articles and other news items referenced in this briefing come from third party media sources. Not being the author, IPIS is not responsible for the content of the news items or articles contained or referred to in this briefing.
This briefing was produced with the financial assistance of the European Union. The contents of the editorial is the sole responsibility of IPIS and can under no circ*mstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the European Union.
